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In 2016, the campaign and subsequent election of the 45th US President Donald Trump 
led to a series of outcries and sociopolitical backlash that was felt for months. The lead-up to and 
aftermath of Trump’s presidency seemed to incite more than mere political outrage (​Filipovic 
2016​). There has been an increasing emphasis placed onto the relationship between political 
opinions and interpersonal integrity. Phrases like “Trump supporter” became a pejorative in 
leftist and liberal circles, and the President’s campaign slogan (“Make America Great Again”) 
became symbolic of white nationalism and racial hatred (Crockett Jr 2019). As such, recent 
political discourse (post-2016) has been characteristized as divisive and polarizing.  
In this context, I ask: When did politics become so deeply intertwined with our social 
relationships? A 2018 study, for example, shows that close-tie familial relationships have been 
burdened by increases in political partisanship among the electorate (Chen and Rohla 2018). I 
am interested in if, and how, the political climate can affect peoples’ social behavior at the 
individual level. In particular, I will be examining the relationship between political polarization 
and social or generalized trust. 
Social trust relies on a certain understanding of community, and its strength can be 
indicated by how much we trust one another and how we think people taking advantage of one 
another affects our society. “[Trusting individuals] tend to believe in a common culture, that 
America is held together by shared values....they are also supportive of the legal order” ​(Pickett 
and Wilkinson 2009)​. It would thus appear that the level of trust we have for one another, and 
how we perceive others (as generally altruistic or generally selfish), plays a distinct role in 
individual-level political opinion formation. If we view others in a distrusting manner--that other 
people are selfish, self-interested, and taking advantage of the system--then we are less likely to 
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feel obligated to help out our community. Instead, we may feel more inclined to align with 
conservative ideals that emphasize individualism and hard work (without welfare or hand-outs). 
Wilkinson’s (1996) concept of individualism suggests the “practical separation of each person’s 
interest and identity from those of others”. While conservatism has historically conferred a 
general distrust of the government, these feelings of distrust have been shifted onto ​other people​. 
In other words--it is not that the government cannot be trusted with handling welfare, but rather 
that welfare recipients themselves cannot be trusted.  
  Though we can see how changes in trust may affect personal political decision-making 
(more will be said on this later on), conversely, how does political polarization and increasing 
partisanship affect the way that we trust one another? Previous studies on trust and inequality 
have used income inequality as an independent measure. That is, that “inequality...affects trust, 
not the other way around” (Uslaner 2002, as cited in Pickett and Wilkinson 2009). I argue that 
political polarization has a similar effect on trust. 
As political polarization increases at the institutional level, I hypothesize that general 
social trust will decrease at the respondent level. The marked increase in political polarization 
throughout the past four decades has accompanied other widespread policy changes and systemic 
phenomena, such as increases in income and wealth disparities and negative impacts on health 
outcomes. Increasing income stratification has been shown to have adverse effects on both 
physical and mental health, as well as social cohesion . The predicted relationship between 1
political polarization and social trust would, presumably, imply the presence of other intervening 
1 ​R. G. Wilkinson examines the relationships between health, mortality rates, homicide rates, social cohesion, and 
income inequality. When income inequality is high, “more people are denied access to sources of status, respect, and 
prestige and so are more likely to feel sensitive and vulnerable to being disrespected” (Wilkinson 1999, pp. 530). 
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factors that relate the two variables, just as Wilkinson (1999) suggested how health indicators 
may play a role in elucidating the relationship between income inequality and social cohesion.  
It is also important to address the relationship between health and socioemotional 
behavior. “Health in relation to friendship, social support, and social involvement shows that 
mortality rates can be two to four times as high among those who are poorly socially integrated 
compared with those with more friends, more social support, or more community involvement” 
(Wilkinson 1999). Wilkinson (1999) also suggests a relationship between relative deprivation (a 
form of inequality found in especially in the poor in market economies) and a poorer social 
environment and violence. Furthermore, he claims that the market institutionalizes 
individualism—and it ends up affecting other aspects of social life; human interaction then 
becomes “dominated by the asocial values of the market” (Wilkinson 1996). Because the market 
produces inequality, it would then follow that social values and interactions, such as positive 
social trust and social cohesion, are formed due to the structural processes responsible for 
exacerbating inequality. Wilkinson asserts that humans are not physiologically conditioned to 
endure the amount of stress that incurs from occupying a lower social status and from “the lack 
mutually supportive social relations” (1996), which are products of pervasive inequality. Here, 
Wilkinson provides the theoretical foundations which link individual attitudes to the structure of 
income inequality. I take the relationship one step further, and argue that income inequality acts 
as an indicator of conditions within broader processes, such as public policy and political 
decision-making, which may in turn affect levels of inequality (amongst other things).  
 
Obstructions or impediments to the political decision-making process can lead to ensuing 
adverse social, economic, and cultural consequences, one of them being a decline in social trust. 
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Previous research on political party-sorting suggests that partisan polarization reflects alienating 
“us vs. them” attitudes amongst politically active individuals .  “As parties become more 2
homogeneous, political issues become more partisan and divisive”, which propagates political 
gridlock and erodes attempts at bipartisanship (Fiorina 2016). Thus, policy--which may in fact 
help improve factors such as crime rates, health outcomes, wealth disparities, poverty, hunger, 
etc.--is stagnated; which in turn may lead to declines in social trust and social cohesion. Given 
the above, I predict that political polarization will be negatively related to social trust.  
Methods 
The phenomenon of “social trust”, or how much individuals may trust one another in 
general, is difficult to quantify. To find an appropriate quantitative measure of social trust, 
pre-existing data was taken from the General Social Survey (GSS) from years 1978-2018. The 
GSS is a widely-used national survey that “g​athers data on contemporary American society in 
order to monitor and explain trends and constants in attitudes, behaviors, and attributes” (“About 
the GSS” 2016​).  
I adopted methods based on Kawachi et al.’s 1997 study ​Social Capital, Income 
Inequality and Mortality, ​which​ ​focused on assessing how income inequality is related to social 
cohesion and mortality rates. The data used to measure social capital was drawn from the 
General Social Survey to measure levels of civic engagement and social trust. The two primary 
aspects of social capital were stated to be civic engagement and social trust. 
 “Social trust was assessed from responses to two General Social Survey items that asked: 
‘Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or 
2 ​“...The more partisan or ideological the respondents, the more they exaggerate the differences between themselves 
and their political adversaries (from Westfall et. al 2015)....[Researchers found] systematic exaggeration of 
polarization: the positions actually held by Republicans, for example, are not as extreme as Democrats think they 
are, and vice versa. Consistent with various psychological theories, the tendency to push the other side further away 
is stronger than the tendency to exaggerate the extremity of one’s own side” (Fiorina 2016, pp. 32) 
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would they try to be fair?’ (perceived lack of fairness) and ‘Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?’ (social mistrust). In addition to the social trust items, we evaluated the response 
to another General Social Survey item as a marker of social capital: "Would you say that 
most of the time people try to be helpful, or are they mostly looking out for themselves?" 
(perceived helpfulness)” (Kawachi et al. 1997).  
 
From a study referenced in Pickett and Wilkinson’s ​The Spirit Level​ (2009), social trust 
within the US was analyzed using the same item from the GSS, “can most people be trusted or 
that you can’t be too careful?” to compare and analyze the effects of income inequality on social 
trust. However, the “trust” variable alone did not satisfy the entire dimension of what I aim to 
capture; which is generalized social trust among individuals, and their obligations to and 
perceptions of others.  
 
Dependent Variable 
Using factor analysis to pinpoint a selection of variables believed to be associated with 
feelings of trust and socioemotional well-being, three variables were summed to generate a scale 
denoting social trust. The three variables were coded by the GSS as “trust”, “helpful”, and “fair”. 
Table A​ shows the label, associated survey question asked, and the answer options available to 









Variable label Survey question Answer options  
trust Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you 
can't be too careful in 
dealing with people? 
1. Can trust, 
2. Cannot trust, 
3. Depends  
helpful Would you say that most of 
the time people try to be 
helpful, or that they are 
mostly just looking out for 
themselves? 
1. Helpful,  
2. Lookout for 
self, 
3. Depends 
fair Do you think most people 
would try to take advantage 
of you if they got a chance, 






Table A: GSS Survey questions 
 
These variables were selected based on keyword searches through the GSS database. 
Keywords such as “trust”, “help”, “fair”, “social”, “satisfy”, “confident”, and variables were 
chosen based on relevance of survey questionnaire and range of years in which the variable 
questionnaire was administered. Of the several dozen variables selected and analyzed, factor 
analysis (see ​Table B)​ was used to identify the three that were strongly correlated with one 
another, and driven by a single underlying factor that I term “social trust”.  
Each of these survey questions indicate a different aspect that, once combined, indicates a 
more general interpretation of social trust. Each survey response denotes the respondent’s 
sentiment towards others, and how they ​view​ other people. As such, these survey questions focus 
on the perception that the respondent has of others. The questions of “fairness” and “helpfulness” 
were included, alongside the question of “trustworthiness”, to examine other and more indirect 
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dimensions of social trust. These three values were also used to indicate social trust and social 
capital by Kawachi et. al (1997).  
 
 Factor Loading Uniqueness 
trust 0.561 0.684 
helpful 0.577 0.666 
fair 0.618 0.618 
Table B: Factor analysis for the three variables from the GSS, “trust”, “helpful”, “fair”, which are driven 
by underlying condition “social trust”. Factor loading > 0.50 considered acceptable. Eigenvalue= 1.031 
 
Independent Variable  
To measure polarization, I used data compiled by ​Voteview, ​which hosts a compilation of 
data measuring congressional ideology on a libeal-conservative scale using DW-Nominate data 
procedures (Dynamic Weighted NOMINAI Three-step Estimation). Developed by political 
researchers Poole and Rosenthal, the DW-Nominate procedure is a “scaling procedure”, and 
indicates the level of ideological closeness, on liberal and conservative dimensions, between 
legislators (Poole et. al. 2019). I measured political polarization by deriving average scores from 
the​ party-mean-difference​, which indicate the difference in ideological scores between 
Republicans and Democrats. The average was taken of this score from House and Senate (from 












Figure D: DW-NOMINATE scores showing party-mean polarization. “Each point indicates the 
differences between the parties’ mean DW-NOMINATE scores, with higher values along the vertical axis 
indicating greater party polarization. DW-NOMINATE scores for individual legislators range from -1 to 
1” (Moskowitz et al. 2019). 
To ensure that the effect of polarization on trust was not driven by some other variable 
that is correlated with both social trust and polarization, my analyses controlled for the following 
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factors: individual political ideology, race, sex, geographical region, income, unemployment, and 
year from 1978-2018.  
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
social trust  6.007 2.221 
polarization  .709 .078 
Table C: Descriptive statistics for variables “social trust” and “polarization”, for years 1978-2018 (Based 
on Model 2) 
 
Results 
The goal was to determine if there was a relationship between political polarization and 
general social trust in the US. ​Table 2 ​displays the scaled relationship (using z-scores) of the two 
variables ​social trust ​(zTrustScale)​ ​and ​polarization ​(zPolarization) through 2018. While 
polarization increases over this period, trust is on the decline, as anticipated. To ensure this 
pattern is not explained by some other factor, I used multivariate regression to control for other 
factors. The results (​Table 1​) revealed a statistically significant negative relationship between 
general political polarization and social trust. That is, as polarization increased, social trust 




Table 2: ​Standardized scores showing the negative relationship between social trust and polarization (year 
2018 included) 
 
These results confirm the hypothesis that polarization results in decreased social trust. 
There is a negative relationship between polarization and social trust. As political polarization 
increases by a factor of 1 unit, social trust decreases by 1.817. When considering the effects of 
race and gender on social trust, on aggregate, from years 1978-2016, black respondents have 
lesser degrees of social trust (-1.110) than other races (-.751). Respondents’ income (.107) .sex 














MODEL 1 (2016) 
Coef.  
(Std. Err.) 
    MODEL 2 (2018) 
     Coef.  
   (Std. Err.) 
Polarization  -1.817*** 
(.3155) 
  -2.282*** 
  (.320) 




































Note: ***p<.001.  
MODEL 1 n=27,565; MODEL 2 n=30,438 (includes year 2018) 
Excluded ​geographical region, unemployment, and year.  
 
 
To supplement my initial findings, I next examined a more political and economic 
dimension of “trust” that was additionally documented by the GSS from 1978-2018. The 
variables in question look into respondents’ confidence (or trust) in American institutions; 
primarily those governed by economic and political policy. The survey question asked, “As far 
as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of 
confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?”; the specific 
institutions selected included the legislative branch of the federal government, US Supreme 
Court, Executive Branch of the federal government, press, education, major companies, and 
banks and financial institutions (see Table E).  
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Confidence in: Factor Loading Uniqueness 
Legislature 0.637 0.583 





























Table E: Factor analysis for the seven “confidence” variables from the GSS, which are driven by 
underlying condition “confidence in institutions”. Factor loading > 0.50 considered acceptable. 
Eigenvalue=  1.834. 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of regression results from predicting confidence in institutions. 
 MODEL 3 (2016) 
Coef. 
Std. Err. 























Note: ***p<.001.  
MODEL 3 n=25,342; MODEL 4 n= 26,538 (includes year 2018) 
Excluded ​geographical region, unemployment, and year; sex and political views p>.05.  
 
True, 12 
 Mean  Std. Dev. 
confidence inst. 13.849  2.764 
polarization  .709 .078 
Table E: Descriptive statistics for variables “confidence in institutions” and “polarization”, for years 
1978-2018 (Based on Model 4) 
 
In this analysis, the relationship between the two variables is much more intuitive; as 
such, these findings act as supplementary to the initial hypothesis rather than stand-alone results. 
The same measure of political polarization was used to analyze the relationship between 
polarization and confidence in institutions. These findings, along with the initial measures of 
general social trust, support the argument that political polarization leads to decreased trust in 
political and economic institutions. ​Table 3​ shows the negative relationship between polarization 
and confidence in institutions in 2018 (-7.326) and in 2016 (-5.739). From year 2016 (see ​Model 
3​), respondents’ income (-.048) and race (.177 for blacks, .893 for others) did not appear to have 
significant impacts on confidence in institutions. Sex and political ideology (liberal vs. 
conservative) were excluded from both models (p>.05). The analysis controlled for the same 
factors: political ideology, race, sex, geographical region, income, unemployment, and year from 
1978-2016, with social trust and year 2018 included. According to Welch et al. (2005), a 
significant area of research in political science aims to uncover “the extent to which institutional 
trust is influenced by interpersonal trust.” Interestingly, social trust did not appear to have a 
significant impact on confidence in institutions (.199 for 2016, .196 for 2018), when compared 





The GSS, while comprehensive in the vast collection of data which it provides over 
nearly four decades, is nonetheless limited in the breadth of survey questions that it may 
consistently ask over an extended time period. The three items used to determine ​general social 
trust​ are thus limited as well. “Trust” is a relational item; its variance is an indication of 
respondents’ feelings and attitudes in relation to how they perceive others. As such, it is an 
inherently subjective measure.  
Another potential limitation lies in the type of variable itself. As Uslaner (2002) 
suggested, “the kind of trust that is being measured in surveys [such as the GSS] is trust of 
strangers, of...people who are often not like us” (Pickett and Wilkinson 2005). There are other 
dimensions of general social trust, such as those that examine variability in close-tie 
relationships, that are not captured in the three-item ​social trust ​variable.  
On the measure of polarization, I specifically examine “elite polarization”, occurring 
between members of Congress rather than amongst the public (Fiorina and Abrams 2008). One 
explanation for the increase in elite polarization over time suggests that “republicans’ movement 
toward the ideological extremes thereby accounts for a disproportionate share of increased 
polarization.” (Moskowitz et al. 2019) Even considering this, the results showing the negative 
correlation between social trust and polarization still stand. This finding could give insight into 
further analysis and study of this relationship, however. In other words, that perhaps another 
dimension of the bivariate relationship involves increasing conservatism in the US and in 
congress.  
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 It is important to note that these measures of marked elite polarization may not 
accurately reflect the publics’ social or political attitudes, in spite of the fact that Congress 
members must, after all, be chosen by voters. Baker (2005) suggests that “almost all social 
attitudes—even about emotionally charged issues such as homosexuality—are not 
polarized….most social attitudes are….becoming even more similar over time” (cited in Fiorina 
and Abrams 2008).  
 
Discussion 
Wilkinson (1996) suggests that differences in social cohesion are indicative of structural 
issues rather than due to variances at the individual level. For example, when income inequality 
is high, “more people are denied access to sources of status, respect, and prestige and so are more 
likely to feel sensitive and vulnerable to being disrespected” (Wilkinson 1999). I argue that there 
is a similar relationship between elite polarization and social trust. The results show that social 
trust and polarization are inversely correlated. These findings could help to explain psycho-social 
changes in perceptions of and relationships with others at the individual level. I interpreted the 
relationship by drawing two possible conclusions from the findings.  
First, that public policy decisions can contribute to, exacerbate, ​or​ alleviate structural 
inequalities. Structural inequality, such as racial, income, and wealth inequality, leads to poorer 
social cohesion and leads to lower levels of trust between individuals. This may occur due to a 
variety of factors, including differential physical and mental health outcomes, crime rates, and 
conditions of poverty, which are outcomes of worsening structural inequalities. When the public 
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policy decision-making process is polarized, structural inequalities worsen, which leads to 
decreased social trust.  
The second explanation is that polarization at the institutional level “trickles down” into 
public perception through media and popular culture. Increased elite polarization creates the 
illusion that the electorate is also deeply polarized, and non-elite individuals align themselves 
with the increasingly partisan political groups. As these political groups (liberal and 
conservative) grow more distant from each other, “each party gradually comes to have less 
contact with, knowledge of, and sympathy for the constituencies of the other” (Fiorina 2016). 
The increasing schism between parties arouses feelings of distrust and disdain among the 
populace, which is recognized as a decline in social trust. 
Individual-level political attitudes may remain similar across decades, however, evidence 
suggests that elite polarization (or polarization at an institutional level) has increased 
significantly. Variations in social trust may be influenced by systemic consequences of 
institutional elite polarization, which would not necessarily reflect or be reflected in polarization 
of the electorate. While there is a clear correlation between elite polarization and our measure of 
social trust, the effects of individual-level party ideology (on liberal-conservative lines) do not 
have a significant impact on degree of trust (see ​Table 1). ​According to earlier studies of the GSS 
and NES data by DiMaggio (1996) and Evans (2003), there are no findings that “support for the 
proposition that the United States has experienced dramatic polarization in public opinion on 
social issues since the 1970s” (retrieved from Fiorina and Abrams 2008). According to Fiorina 
and Abrams (2008), 
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“The political positions of Americans had not become more polarized between the early 
1970s and early 2000s. Importantly, however, within the larger population the parties in 
the electorate had become more distinct.” 
 
In his 2016 book, “Unstable Majorities”, Fiorina continues this claim that “the way that 
Americans self-categorize their ideological positions has changed little in four decades”.  
The findings from ​Table 1 ​confirm this claim as well, revealing that the GSS measure of political 
ideology (.049) did not have as significant of an impact on trust compared to the effects of 
increased elite polarization. The jump from -1.817 in Model 1 (the data up to 2016), to -2.282 in 
Model 2 (including data from 2018) is significant. This suggests that, in the two-year span 
following Trump’s election to office, there is a significant decline in aggregate social trust, a 
change of -0.465. This finding provides backing for the aforementioned sentiment regarding 
interpersonal strain upon the election of President Trump.  
However, when looking at the supplementary analysis of confidence in institutions 
amidst increasing political polarization, there is a marked increase in confidence from -7.326 in 
2016 (Model 3) to -5.739 in 2018 (Model 4). This finding suggests that, in spite of declining 
rates of trust and increased polarization from 2016 to 2018, that confidence in institutions has 
slightly increased--although there is still a notable negative correlation between confidence in 
institutions and polarization at the institutional level. This negative relationship implies that 
increased polarization within political and economic institutions results in individuals’ decreased 
confidence (or “trust”) in said institutions.  
Though the extent to which social trust begets trust in institutions (and vice versa) is 
inconclusive from these findings, there is evidence that both factors are negatively correlated 
with increases in elite polarization. From a sociological perspective, preserving social trust is 
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important so that “that vibrant communities will inevitably generate enough social capital to 
meet the needs of individuals and the common good” (Welch et al. 2005). From an economic 
perspective, preserving social trust is essential to “enhance economic exchange” (Putnam 2000, 
Krishna 2000; Welch et al. 2005), and maintaining high levels of confidence in social, political, 
economic, and financial institutions is arguably necessary for the effective functioning of these 
institutions. Thus, from both an economic ​and​ sociological perspective, there arises an incentive 
to attempt to preserve and restore social trust and confidence in institutions, and to decrease 
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